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CHAPTER b 
Addiction as sin and syndrome: the divided self 
The aim of this chapter is to reflect theologically upon the concept of 
addiction with a view to exploring some possibilities for the construction 
of a theological model of addiction. This is not exactly a proposal for a 
dialogue between Christian theology and science, ' but it does presuppose 
that a kind of conversation can be established between Christian theology 
and the scientific study of addiction. 
Alistair McFadyen2 has drawn attention to the twin dangers that contem- 
porary theology faces. On the one hand, it is at risk of reducing conversation 
about God to purely secular terms, such that it has no real contribution 
to make to the discussion. On the other hand, it is at risk of withdraw- 
ing completely from secular discourse about material reality and confining 
itself to the non-material fields of the spiritual and the moral. Both are 
perceived by McFadyen as essentially `non-Christian' positions; forms of 
collusion with the `pragmatic atheism' of secular discourse. For McFadyen, 
the 'one possibility by which modern theology may live'3 is that it might 
engage in a critical dialogue with the secular. Thus `the business of Christian 
theology ... 
is to understand both God and reality from the perspective 
of God's concrete presence and activity in the world, and in relation to our 
concretely lived experiences of being in the world'. 4 McFadyen proceeds 
to illustrate this in relation to the doctrine of sin. His study, published 
under the title Bound to Sin, sets out to test the proposition that the doc- 
trine of sin holds `explanatory and descriptive power in relation to concrete 
pathologies'. 5 He endeavours to achieve this aim by means of the study 
of two particular pathologies: childhood sexual abuse and the Holocaust. 
His specific claim is both exacting and challenging: `the concrete patholo- 
gies operating in child sexual abuse and the holocaust cannot adequately 
be understood except with reference to the denial and opposition to God 
At least not in terms of the dialogue between science and religion proposed by Ian Barbour and others 
(Barbour, 1998, pp. 90-98). 
McFadven, zooo. { Ibid., p. 43.4 Ibid., p. 44. Ibid., p. S. 
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which characterises sin. " Focussing primarily upon the Augustinian doc- 
trine of original sin, McFadyen skilfully marshals extensive evidence in 
support of his claim. This includes evidence that, for victims of both child- 
hood sexual abuse and the Holocaust, any notion of willing as based purely 
upon free decision and arbitrary choice is clearly simplistic. ' Just as the 
doctrine of original sin would suggest, people in practice find themselves 
`embedded' in sin for which they are not morally accountable on the basis 
of moral culpability understood solely in terms of the exercise of free will. ' 
More importantly, however, McFadyen believes that both pathologies can 
be construed in terms of worship and idolatry. 
For McFadyen, worship `is actively to orientate and order one's life, 
whether more or less explicitly, around a reality as primary to and constitu- 
tive of meaning, worth, truth and value'. `' Whereas `loving joy' is the mark 
of worship of God, idolatry is characterised by the blocking and disorien- 
tation of this joy. '° Sin, even when its agent is also a victim and not morally 
accountable in the usual sense, leads to constriction of joy. Thus, McFadyen 
finds that his dialogue between the doctrine of sin and the concrete patholo- 
gies that he chose to study leads to both an enriched understanding of the 
pathologies in question and also an enriched understanding of the doctrine 
of sin. " His exploration of these two concrete pathologies of sin thus leads 
him to understand sin in relation to joy in worship of God as Trinity: 
Sin now appears as energised resistance to the dynamics of God and, thereby, as 
constriction in the fullness of being-in-communion and of joy. Sin is thus construed 
primarily in dynamic terms, as highly energised, comprehensive disorientation in, 
through and of all relationships. Such energised disorientation is also communica- 
ble and, whilst the claim of biological transmission has not been amenable to testing 
in relation to these pathologies, it is clear that this disorientation is transmittable 
through the dynamics of social relationships. " 
McFadyen makes an extremely convincing case in respect of the explana- 
tory and descriptive power of the doctrine of sin in relation to both his 
chosen pathologies. It is, perhaps, more debatable whether or not he shows 
that these pathologies can be adequately understood only in the context 
of a theistic (specifically Christian) doctrine of sin. What would it mean 
adequately to understand either childhood sexual abuse or the Holocaust 
in any context? " However, his methodology at least allows an interesting 
6 Ibid., p. 54, original emphasis preserved. Ibid., p. 126. Ibid., p. 129. 
9 Ibid., p. 227. "° Ibid., p. 232. " Ibid., p. 246. `= Ibid., pp. 246--247. 
" McFadven seems to be asking whether or not the language of moral responsibility offers a suf frcinu 
description of the pathologies in question (ibid., p. 112). However, even if it is accepted that he has 
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dialogue to emerge and arguably does result in an enriched understand- 
ing of both the two pathologies and the Christian theology with which he 
brings them into dialogue. The important question in the present context is 
whether or not a similar methodology might assist in developing a creative 
or illuminative dialogue between Christian theology and the pathology of 
addiction. 
It is argued here that McFadyen's methodology is well suited to a theo- 
logical reflection upon the phenomenon of addiction. Addiction certainly 
shares the characteristics according to which McFadyen selected his two 
pathologies, namely an almost universal recognition of the reality of, and 
the pathological nature of, the phenomenon, '4 an extensive descriptive 
and research literature, and obvious complexity. It is true that addiction is 
morally more ambiguous. The moral model of addiction is now unpop- 
ular, and those who subscribe to the disease model would argue that it is 
not primarily a matter of moral culpability that one suffers from the dis- 
ease of addiction. On the other hand, there is a long Christian tradition 
of recognising addiction (e. g. as `habitual drunkenness') as sin. However, 
this moral ambiguity may make the dialogue more interesting, and may 
allow more opportunity for Christian theology to demonstrate explanatory 
power (or not). Scientific theories of addiction also incorporate a biological 
dimension of aetiology, which is not a prominent factor in either of the 
pathologies selected by McFadyen. This may be of relevance to Augustine's 
belief in the biological transmission of original sin, an aspect of the doctrine 
which McFadyen found could not be tested by his chosen pathologies. Fur- 
thermore, the present task is fundamentally a similar one to that intended 
by McFadyen - namely to show that Christian theology holds explanatory 
power in relationship to a specified concrete pathology (i. e. addiction). 
However, McFadyen set out to test the explanatory power of Chris- 
tian theology, exemplified by the doctrine of sin, in the context of the 
succeeded in showing that such language alone is insufficient, and that Christian theology does offer 
a sufficient description, his methodology does not allow him to prove conclusively that a Christian 
doctrine of sin offers the only sufficient description of these pathologies. 
This statement should not 
be 
taken to imply assent to the disease model, and neither should this 
footnote be taken to imply dissent from that model. It is rather argued that there is common assent, 
in a general and pragmatic way, to the 'pathological' nature of addictive behaviour as maladaptive, 
deviant or dysfunctional. Even when alcoholism or addiction as a disease is described as 'myth', it 
is still recognised that alcohol misuse and addictive behaviours are real social problems to which 
appropriate social and individual responses are required (see, for example, Fingarette, 1989; Davies, 
Zooo). In passing, it is important also to note that, in Bound to Sin, McFadyen uses the term 
'pathology' extensively, and even describes sin as 'a way of speaking of the pathological aspects of 
the world encountered by human beings as the), live in it' (McFayden, 2000, p. 44) but yet does not 
define what he means by that term. He appears to have in mind a broad understanding, including 
both sin and sickness. 
14 
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contemporary secular understanding of two concrete pathologies. The 
present exercise is concerned less with demonstrating the explanatory 
power of Christian theology in principle, and more with understand- 
ing the problem of addiction in theological terms, or with showing that 
Christian theology has a useful contribution to make to discourse about 
addiction. It is therefore by definition concerned with only one con- 
crete pathology: namely, addiction. Furthermore, this pathology is already 
capable of description according to diverse, and sometimes contradictory, 
explanatory models. It is therefore proposed that some minor modifications 
of McFadyen's methodology are required. 
First, following McFadyen, the concrete pathology (i. e. addiction) has 
already been described, in Chapters i and 2, according to understanding 
developed in secular scientific discourse, using non-theological language. 
The description has largely focussed on one particular conceptual frame- 
work of understanding - that of the dependence syndrome - which has 
been chosen for reasons already outlined. The scope has been limited largely 
to one specific drug, alcohol, both in order to simplify the discussion and 
also to allow a longer historical context of theological reflection to be exam- 
ined. It has been seen that addiction to alcohol can properly be understood 
only in the broader context of the use and misuse of alcohol by populations 
and by individuals. However, because the concept of the alcohol depen- 
dence syndrome has been extrapolated to other forms of drug misuse, and 
to other behaviours, the conclusions drawn here are of relevance to broader 
theological reflection on addiction. 
Secondly, the theological focus of the discussion will be broadened 
slightly. Two theological perspectives on sin (albeit not unrelated) have 
been chosen rather than one, because the aim is to explore theological pos- 
sibilities in relation to the concrete pathology of addiction, rather than to 
explore a particular doctrine in relation to different concrete pathologies. 
Limitations of space will prevent a comprehensive engagement with either 
of these theological frameworks. However, it is hoped that an initial explo- 
ration of the possibilities that they offer will provide at least a preliminary 
indication of the way in which theological language might assist in devel- 
oping a more adequate understanding of the phenomenon of addiction. 
The two theological perspectives that have been selected for considera- 
tion here are those of St Paul the apostle and St Augustine of Hippo. These 
two theological systems have been chosen partly with a view to the enduring 
influence that they have had upon Christian theology, and thus western cul- 
ture, and partly because of the particular promise that they would appear to 
offer in relation to this field. Augustine (and probably Paul) also had relevant 
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pastoral experience of dealing with drunkenness among members of his 
Christian community. '5 
In addition to their broader theological analysis of sin, both Paul and 
Augustine wrote about the subjective experience of inner conflict, or strug- 
gle, in relation to willed action. This theological attention to the way in 
which human beings find themselves behaving in ways that they personally 
dislike, or would wish not to do, would appear to be especially relevant 
to the understanding of a pathology which essentially involves habitual 
behaviour that people find difficult to control despite the pain and harm 
that it causes. 
In each case, a particular text has been selected from the work of the 
author in question, in order to provide a focus for the discussion. These texts 
have been selected by virtue of the promise that they show as descriptions of 
subjective experiences which would appear to be similar to that of addiction. 
In the case of Paul, the selected text is the description of the divided self to 
be found in Romans 7: 14-25. In the case of Augustine, the selected text is 
book VIII of his Confessions, in which he relates his own autobiographical 
experience of a divided will. 
Thirdly, the engagement here with the theologies of Paul and Augustine 
will be set firmly in the historical context of Christian engagement with 
problems of drunkenness. It is important that any exploration of a possible 
theological model of alcohol addiction/dependence should be understood 
in the context of the differing Christian responses to problems of drunk- 
enness over the centuries. This context has already been set in Chapters 3 
to 5, but it will be recapitulated here and some further brief comments will 
be added. 
The primary purpose of this exercise is to explore some possibilities 
for the construction of a Christian theological model of addiction. Sec- 
ondarily, however, the methodology may allow some further reflection on 
McFadyen's question about whether or not a specifically Christian theo- 
logical discourse can offer additional explanatory and descriptive power in 
relation to an area of secular discourse. 
THE HISTORICAL CHRISTIAN CONTEXT FOR A THEOLOGY 
OF ADDICTION 
I have argued in Chapter 3 that drunkenness was recognised by Old and 
New Testament authors as a problem of excessive indulgence of an appetite, 
's In relation to Paul, see Chapter 3. In relation to Augustine, see Chapter 4. 
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rather similar to gluttony as excessive indulgence in food. However, it was 
also recognised as a problem which led to a range of other vices, including 
`sins of speech', sexual immorality, violence, strife and jealousy. In the New 
Testament, drunkenness is represented as a `desire of the flesh'; a manifesta- 
tion of a life under a power which is `not God', and inappropriate to life in 
the eschatological kingdom of God. While early Christian understanding 
of the problem of drunkenness shared much with Jewish and Greco-Roman 
culture, it was also distinctive in this way. Drunkenness was seen to be the 
result of a desire which exerts a power over an individual, which competes 
with the call of God, and which results in a life which is inappropriate to, 
or unready for, the coming kingdom of God. 
As the centuries passed, i6 drunkenness remained a problem for the 
Church, and successive Christian theologians resorted to scripture, phi- 
losophy and the traditions of the Church in a quest to understand it and 
respond to it. For Augustine, and later Aquinas, drunkenness was under- 
stood primarily as failing to contribute to the ultimate good. For Augustine, 
it represented a failure to strive to please God alone. For Aquinas, it was an 
impairment of the ability of human beings to fulfil the rational function 
for which they were created. With the Reformation came an increasing 
emphasis upon scripture as the basis for Protestant attitudes to the prob- 
lem. For Luther, drunkenness was analogous to the sin of Adam and Eve 
in Eden, but it needed no other verdict than that it was expressly forbid- 
den in scripture. It was a state of misdirected will rather than a state of 
impaired reason. For Whitefield, drunkenness was improper stewardship 
of wine, which was one of God's creatures, but again the express injunction 
of scripture against drunkenness was his primary basis for argument. 
Augustine, Aquinas, Luther and Whitefield were all strongly influenced 
by Pauline theology, but, for Augustine and Aquinas, philosophy was also 
important. For Augustine and Luther, drunkenness was a work of the flesh. 
For Augustine this meant that it arises, as do other works of the flesh, from 
human pride. For Luther, it meant that drunkenness arises from a corrupt 
human nature which is prone to excesses and self-indulgence. 
Augustine and Aquinas also left in their writings broader theological 
concepts with incompletely explored potential for a more sophisticated 
Christian theological exploration of contemporary problems of drunken- 
ness and alcohol misuse. For example, Augustine's concept of the divided 
will has enormous relevance to an understanding of how people engage with 
desires or appetites that impel them towards goals that they recognise as 
16 See Chanter :. 
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being inherently undesirable. Similarly, Aquinas' concept of the mean of 
virtues has the potential to relate `normal' drinking ethically to drunkenness 
and to other alcohol-related problems in a manner which is harmonious 
with current scientific thinking. 
Prior to the nineteenth-century, drunkenness was generally understood 
by all Christians as being sinful, but drinking alcohol was not. Drunkards 
were sinners, because they allowed their will to follow their sinful desire to 
drink excessively and did not sufficiently desire, or act upon their desire for, 
the virtue of temperance. However, during the nineteenth century, in the 
light of new medical conceptions of the problem, this all changed. Habit- 
ual intemperance came to be understood by large numbers of Christians 
(albeit mainly Protestants, and certainly not all of them) as the virtually 
inevitable result of almost any regular alcohol consumption, which would 
create a strong, and perhaps uncontrollable, desire for alcohol. The habit- 
ual drunkard came to be seen as victim more than sinner, a sufferer from a 
cruel disease, the evil cause of which was alcohol itself. Intemperance was 
reconceived as being moderate alcohol consumption, and temperance as 
complete abstinence from alcohol. '7 
During the twentieth century, these attitudes changed once more. As the 
temperance movement declined in influence, moderate alcohol consump- 
tion was again accepted by most western Christians as being good, and 
drunkenness was still understood as bad. However, this `badness' was not 
a simple return to the attitudes of pre-nineteenth-century Christendom, 
and neither was it a simple continuation of nineteenth-century temperance 
thinking. For many, a specific problem of 'alcoholism' or 'alcohol addic- 
tion' was understood as being a disease. ` Drunkenness was certainly to 
be distinguished from this disease, but was nonetheless also an important 
symptom of it. In contrast, the so-called `moral model' of alcoholism was 
widely dismissed by secular discourse as being unhelpful. In fact, a variety 
of models of alcoholism was propounded and, to a greater or lesser degree, 
the models existed alongside one another. '9 
Contemporary scientific understanding, as described briefly above, now 
views alcohol dependence as a bio-psycho-social disorder. It is clear that 
this context provides an understanding of the nature of alcohol-related 
Sec Chapter S. 'x S. Y. Hill, i 8j, Meyer, 1996. 
Siegler, 1968. Even by the end of the twentieth century, there is evidence that a significant minority 
of educated young people conceptualised alcohol abuse as both sin and disease, or as both sin and 
addiction. Furthermore, conceptualisation of illicit drug (cocaine) abuse as sinful was endorsed by 5' 
per cent of respondents -a similar proportion to that endorsing the disease concept (Cunningham 
et al., 1994). 
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problems radically different from that encountered by the apostle Paul, 
Augustine, Aquinas or the Church Reformers. It is a clear improvement on 
the medical and social understanding of nineteenth-century physicians and 
theologians. There is thus a need for a contemporary theological and ethical 
analysis of the most appropriate Christian foundations for understanding 
drunkenness, alcohol dependence, and other alcohol-related problems. 
A PAULINE THEOLOGY OF SIN AND ADDICTION 
Paul has been referred to as `the first and greatest Christian theologian 20 
He was a zealous Jew, a native of Tarsus in Cilicia, 2' who had trained 
as a Pharisee. 22 He persecuted the young Christian Church, 23 until an 
experience on the Damascus road, probably in the early 30s CE, 24 left him 
with a conviction of being commissioned by God to take the gospel - the 
good news about Jesus Christ - to the Gentiles . 
21 The missionary work that 
he undertook in response to this call was controversial, especially among 
Jewish Christians 2' because of his insistence that circumcision should not 
be a requirement for Gentile converts2' and his support for non-observance 
of food laws by Jewish Christians. 2' He was probably martyred in Rome, 
under Nero, around 62-65 CE. 29 
Paul was a Roman citizen, with a substantial Greek education. 3° He left 
seven epistles which are generally agreed to be of authentic authorship, all of 
which were probably written in the mid-sos CE. 3' From these writings it is 
possible to adduce that Paul saw his faith in Jesus Christ as the fulfilment of 
the faith of the Hebrew people, and not as a departure from it. 32 However, 
Christ was central to Paul's theology. Christ replaced the Torah as the 
defining characteristic of the people of God and of the purposes of God. 
The image of the body of Christ replaced the Temple cult as the defining 
context of the faith community. God was to be known definitively through 
Christ. Christ was the hermeneutical key to scripture. Salvation was to be 







Dunn, 1998, p. 2. " Acts 22: 3; Dunn (1988a), p. xl. 
Philippians 3: 5; Galatians 1: 13-14. Z' Galatians 1: 13. 
Dunn, 1988a, p. xli. ZS Galatians 1: 15-16; Romans 1: 5. 
See Dunn, 1988a, pp. xxxix-xliii. Z' Galatians 2: 1-1o. Galatians 2: 11-14- 
Cross and Livingstone, 1997, pp. 1234-1235. ;O Dunn, 1988a, p. xl. 
Romans, i and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, i Thessalonians and Philemon. In addition, 
various claims are made for Pauline authorship of Colossians, 2 Thessalonians, Ephesians and the 
pastoral epistles. Except perhaps for Colossians and 2 Thessalonians, these claims would appear 
dubious (see Cross and Livingstone, 1997, p. 1235). 
See Dunn, 1998, pp. 713-737, on which the following account of Paul's theology is largely based. 
i= 
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James Dunn has suggested that among the most innovative and endur- 
ing features of Christian theology which may be traced to Paul were his 
distinctive Christian understandings of gospel, grace and love. 33 The `good 
news' of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, grace as the epitome 
of God's dealings with human beings, and love as the motive for divine 
giving and human living, together encapsulate the breadth and nature of 
Christianity. Of these, it is relevant here to say just a little more about 
grace. 
For Paul, grace was to be understood as the activity of God in bring- 
ing about the redemption of human beings through Christ. 34 Grace is the 
opposite of sin, in that sin is self-centred whereas the grace of God is mani- 
fested in outgoing love. 35 Grace is offered by God as a gift to human beings. 
Grace is concerned with divine initiative, divine activity and divine power, 
all offered to the benefit of undeserving human beings. 36 It is expressed 
particularly in the event of Christ himself, but also in the divine enabling 
of human beings in the course of their daily lives. 37 
An innovation of Paul which has perhaps had less lasting impact is 
that of the distinction between `body' and `flesh'. Flesh (oapQ, in Pauline 
thought, had a range of meaning, but was almost always concerned with the 
weakness and corruptibility of the creature as contrasted with the creator. 38 
Body (acopa) also had a range of meaning, but referred to somewhat more 
than just the physical body. It had a sense of the embodied `I', standing 
in relation to the physical environment. 39 Thus, Dunn suggests that for 
Paul `body' denotes a being in the world, whereas `flesh' denotes a belonging 
to the world. 4° The anthropology defined by this distinction incorporated 
a positive evaluation of the createdness of human beings, derived from 
Hebrew thought, and also a more negative element to life in this world, 
the `desiring, decaying flesh which ... subverts existence 
before and for 
God', 4' derived from Greek thought. 
This distinction also relates to the tension inherent in Paul's eschatology. 
For Paul, the Christian is situated simultaneously in two overlapping ages 
or epochs. The believer, who is still in this world in the flesh, is also in 
Christ, desiring to serve God and do his will. Therein lays a tension, a 
it 
46 
Ibid., p. 733. is Ridderbos, 1977, pp. 173-174. :s Barrett, 1994, p. 90. 
Dunn, 1998, pp. 322-323. `- Ibid., p. 320. 
Dunn, 1988a, p. 363. Ridderbos emphasises more the inclusion of human sinfulness within the 
meaning of this term (Ridderbos, 1977, pp. 93-95). 
Dunn, 1,998, p. 56. Ridderbos again has a slightly different emphasis, noting that the body has a 
spiritual and heavenly sense, as well as a material one, and that the body does not have the negative 
connotations of weakness and sin associated with the Pauline concept of flesh. 
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warfare even, which will continue until the resurrection of the body after 
death. 42 
Paul understood sin as a power over human beings which has a tendency 
to enslave, and to cause them to forget their creaturely dependence upon 
God. Its influence is both upon individuals, their attitudes and actions, 
and also upon the values and practices of society as a whole. 43 For Paul, 
sin was concerned primarily with relationship with God. It involved the 
whole person, and the whole human race. 44 It was concerned with enmity, 
or rebellion, against God himself. 4s Paul offered very little analysis of where 
this power originated from. He was concerned much more with its reality 
in human experience. 46 
Dunn has suggested47 that Paul saw three effects of the power of sin 
in the lives of human beings: misdirected religion, self-indulgence and 
sins. Misdirected religion is manifested as a perversion of the instinct to 
invest ultimate significance in God, such that religion is directed to other 
ends, which remain more easily under human control. Self-indulgence 
is concerned with the way in which neutral or good desires (e. g. sexual 
appetite) become transformed into harmful preoccupations (e. g. lust). Sins 
are those consequences of wrong judgement, made under the power of sin, 
exemplified by the lists of vices that Paul provided in various places. 48 
For Paul, sin was intimately linked with death. 49Death was the inevitable 
consequence of sin, the end of life lived `in the flesh', and the due punish- 
ment for sins. 
Romans 17: 14-25: the 
divided self 
At the time of writing his epistle to the Romans, Paul clearly hoped to 
visit Rome for the first time, en route to Spain. 5° Prior to undertaking 
this missionary journey, it was apparently his intention to visit Jerusalem 
to deliver money collected by Gentile Christians in his churches for the 
(primarily Jewish) Christian poor there. 5' He was concerned, in the wake of 
previous controversies, that this offering might not prove to be acceptable. 5' 
The epistle represents Paul's mature reflection upon, and understanding of, 
the Christian gospel, addressed to a church of some size and importance. 5i 
42 Ibid., p. 475.41 Ibid., pp. I1I-114.44 Barrett, 1994, p. 64.4S Ridderbos, 1977, p. IOS. 
Dunn, 1998, p. 113.4- Ibid., pp. 114-124.0 See Chapter 3. 
Dunn, 1998, pp. 124-127; Barrett, 1994, p" 64. 
Romans 1: 11-15; 15: 23-24; Cranfield, 1995, p. xiii; Ziesler, 1989, p. 3. 
Romans 15: 25-29; Cranfield, 1995, p. xiii. S Romans 15: 31. 
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It incorporates an attempt to address missionary, apologetic and pastoral 
purposes. 54 
Paul's epistle to the Romans deals with the need of Jew and Gentile for 
the grace of God, the means by which they may both be engaged in an 
experience of that grace, and the way in which they should relate together as 
Christians. There is a strong Christological element to the letter, and Paul 
eventually describes a new ethical framework based upon an understanding 
of the community of faith as the body of Christ. 51 An important (and 
complex) subsidiary theme in the letter is that of the place of the law for 
those who are in Christ. 56 
That portion of the letter with which we are most concerned here is 
chapter 7, verses 14-25: 
'4 For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am of the flesh, sold into slavery 
under sin. "I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, 
but I do the very thing I hate. "Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the 
law is good. '. But in fact it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me. 
'8 For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will 
what is right, but I cannot do it. "For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I 
do not want is what I do. "Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that 
do it, but sin that dwells within me. 
"So I find it to be a law that when I want to do what is good, evil lies close 
at hand. "For I delight in the law of God in my inmost self, Z; hut I see in my 
members another law at war with the law of my mind, making me captive to the 
law of sin that dwells in my members. Z4Wretched man that I am! Who will rescue 
me from this body of death% `Thanks he to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! 
So then, with my mind I am a slave to the law of God, but with my flesh I am 
a slave to the law of sin. `- 
This passage must be understood within the context of the whole letter. 
However, the nature, position and detailed exposition of this section of 
the text are differently construed by different commentators. The end of 
chapter 7 clearly represents an important transition by all accounts, as 
chapter 8 changes focus to the more positive theme of `life in the Spirit'. 
However, for some commentators, 7: 14-25 is concerned primarily with the 
experience of the Christian who continues to struggle with sin, and for 
others it is concerned with non-Christian experience. Within the former 
group, some see this as being mature Christian experience and others as a 
way of Christian life which should be left behind. For some it is understood 
14 Dunn, 1988a, pp. IV-IVlll. Si Ibid., pp. Ixi-Ixii; Ziesler, 1989, pp. 6-8- 
" Dunn, 1988a, pp. Ixiii-Ixxii. s' Romans 7: 14-25, NRSV. 
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as more or less autobiographical of Paul's own experience, and for others it 
is not. 58 
By way of example, the interpretations of Cranfield, Dunn and Ziesler 
will be reviewed here, as well as the more psychologically orientated anal- 
ysis offered by Theissen. Cranfield and Dunn understand 7: 14-25 as rep- 
resenting Christian experience, and Ziesler and Theissen as non-Christian 
experience. 
Cranfield59 is clear that verses 13-23 are concerned with `the inner conflict 
characteristic of the true Christian, a conflict such as is possible only in the 
man in whom the Holy Spirit is active and whose mind is being renewed 
under the discipline of the gospel'. 6o For Cranfield, the inner conflict por- 
trayed in verses 16,18 and 19 is the result of a battle `that is not possible 
until a man is sanctified by the Holy Spirit'. 6' His interpretation of the 
passage in question is that the Holy Spirit provides a growing knowledge 
and awareness of God's will as expressed in the law, and also a growing 
will to obey it'. 62 As this Christian growth continues, individuals become 
increasingly perceptive of, and sensitive to, the extent to which sin still has 
power over them . 
6.1 This process should not be misunderstood, however, 
as a conflict between the Holy Spirit and sin. It is rather a reflection of the 
work and power of the Holy Spirit within the human mind and personality 
alongside the continuing power of sin over the self. Thus, Paul writes in 
the first person singular. 64 For Cranfield, Paul's understanding of `the flesh' 
is interpreted in a Calvinistic sense of `fallen human nature' and even his 
best actions will always be marred by egotism. 65 
According to this understanding, verses 24-25 provide a conclusion to 
the previous verses and a link to chapter 8.66 Verse 25b is reflective of the 
eschatological tension experienced by the Christian living in this present 
age, and verse 25a is expressive of confidence in the expectation of future 
deliverance from this tension. 
SR See reviews of the possibilities in Cranfield. 1995, pp. 156-159; Ziesler, 1989, pp. 191-195. For Dodd, 
Romans 7 represents Paul's 'vivid personal recollection' of his pride in the law, the consequent 
repression of natural instincts that this brought about, and the inner conflict that it thus generated 
(Dodd, 1967, pp. 74-75). 
19 For Cranfield, 1: 16b-17 represents a statement of the main theological theme of the body of the letter. 
The quotation from Habakkuk in v. 17, 'But he who is righteous by faith shall live', is then expounded 
in 1: 18-8: 39. In particular, 5: 1-8: 39 is understood as an exposition on the words 'shall live'. Within 
this section 7: 1-25 is concerned with 'a life characterized by freedom from the law's condemnation', 
and 7: 7-25 is considered to be a 'necessary clarification of what has been said concerning the law' 
(Cranfield, 1995, p. xv. ) 
s" Cranfield, 1995, p. 155.61 Ibid., p. 166. Ibid., pp. 166,169. 
6; Ibid., pp. 155,166. (4 See e. g. v. 16, and ibid., pp. 166,168. 
6 Ibid., p. 167.6(' Ibid., pp. 155,169--172. 
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Dunn 67 portrays the inner conflict in verses 15-25 as a split in the `I' 
between willing and doing. 68 He understands Paul as having become aware 
of the power of sin as never before' following his conversion. 69 He also 
sees a parallel between a split in the `I' and a split in the law. The `willing' 
`I' agrees with the law, and wishes to obey it. This is the same `I' that is 
identified with Christ in his death, that is no longer under the law of works, 
and that is obedient to the spiritual law, the law of faith. The 'impotent'' 1', 
however, is the `man of flesh', the `I' not yet identified with Christ in his 
resurrection, the `I' which is still under the law used by sin to bring death. 
A liberation of the `I' has been commenced, but is not yet complete. This 
is not a form of dualism. The flesh is still `I', but life in this world is still 
life in the flesh. The split is therefore one between the two epochs: the old 
epoch of life in this world, in the flesh, over which sin still has power, and 
a new epoch of life in Christ, lived in the power of God. 7° 
Dunn portrays verse 24 as a cry of frustration at the existential plight in 
which Paul finds himself. He too sees verse 2.5a as reflective of confidence 
in the deliverance that will come in Christ, and verse 25b as reflecting the 
eschatological tension inherent in the situation of the believer in this world, 
in whom the work of redemption has been begun but not yet completed. '' 
The tension is initiated, not resolved, at the point of conversion, for it is 
only then that the `eschatological "now" in Christ'72 is introduced. 
For Ziesler'73 7: 14-25 is a description of the `divided self -a description 
of a pre-Christian state, experienced by people who are without Christ. 
Although he admits that this position is debatable, he feels that Paul would 
F- For Dunn, 1: 16-1 ;' also represents a summary of the letter's theme. However, for him, it is the 
whole of vv. 16-17 that provides this summary for the whole letter. A focus on the quotation from 
Habakkuk is considered misguided (Dunn, 1988a, pp. 46-49). The passage of interest to us here 
(i. e. 7: 15-25) is located within a section concerned with the 'outworking of the gospel in relation 
to the individual' (6: 1-8: i9), and is a part of an answer to the question of whether or not grace 
might be understood as encouraging sin (ibid., pp. viii-ix). First, Dunn sees vv. 14-25 as redressing 
any possible misunderstanding created in v. 13 regarding the benefits of remaining under the law. 
Secondly, he sees vv. 14-25 as an exploration of the role of the law in the Christian's experience of 
the eschatological tension created by the continuing power of sin prior to full participation in the 
resurrection of Christ (ibid., p. 404). 
Ibid., p. 406. I" Ibid., p. 407. Ibid., pp. 407-409. 
Ibid., pp. 410-412.2 Ibid., p. 411. 
For Ziesler, 1: 16-17 is again understood as a summary of the whole letter. It is also a bridge between 
the opening thanksgiving in 1: 8-15 and the main body of the letter in 1: 18-11: 36 (Ziesler, 1989, 
pp. 35,67). However, Ziesler sees 7: 1-25 as being the third of four aspects of 
God's 
solution to 
human sinfulness as discussed by Paul (ibid., p. 36). The four aspects of Paul's understanding of 
this divine solution, according to Ziesler, are an end to divine condemnation [4: 1-5: 21], an end to 
bondage to sin [6: 1-23], an end to the divided self [7: 1-25], and an end to life in the flesh [8: 1-25]). 
Romans 7: 1-6 is concerned with the death of the Christian to the law, and 7: 7-13 is concerned with 
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not have given such an extremely negative description of Christians as to 
suggest that they are `sold under sin'. 74 However, he makes the point that 
this passage is concerned primarily with the failure of the law to solve the 
problem of sin, and not with the identity of the `I'. 75 
Ziesler also considers that the nature of the conflict described in this 
passage is debatable. He recognises that the passage is reminiscent of a 
tradition exemplified by a quotation from Ovid, although he considers it 
not precisely the same: `I see and approve the better things, but I pursue the 
inferior things. '76 He points out that, although the notion of the divided 
self is pervasive, it varies throughout the passage. On the one hand are sin, 
the `I' sold under sin, the flesh, and a law in `my members'. On the other 
hand are the `I' that wants to do good, the `inmost self, `the law of my 
mind', and the law of God. Up to verse 20, or perhaps verse 21, the division 
appears to be within the self, but after this it appears to be between different 
laws. 77 In verses 14-16, the opposition is between will and action, in verses 
17-20 it is between self and sin. 78 
Rather more speculatively, Ziesler points out that the passage is preceded 
(vv. 7-13) by, and possibly even followed by (8: 4), a concern with covetous- 
ness or `wrong desire', and that the line of argument works best in respect 
of desires over which people do not have control. ' Is Paul talking here 
primarily about conflicting desires? 
For Ziesler, verse 24 is concerned with the person living under sin, with- 
out Christ. Verse 25a ostensibly presents Christ as the solution to the human 
dilemma. However, verse 25b appears to be an awkward return to that 
dilemma, and is unconvincingly explained by Ziesler as a possible gloss. 8o 
For Theissen, 7: 14-25 is a depiction of suffering `under the flesh'. ' It 
achieves this description by means of two strands of thought, 82 which are 
to be found respectively in verses 15-18 and 19-23. In each, the argument 
begins with the contradiction of willing and doing,; and then moves on to 
a consideration of the power of sin. 84 In the second strand of thought, the 
power of sin is dealt with rather more briefly, but the concluding assent to 
the law is emphasised more strongly, and the theme of a clash between the 
flesh and the law becomes a more greatly emphasised clash between two 
laws (the `law of God' and `another law'). 
-4 Romans 7: 14; ibid., pp. 191-194. 's Ibid., pp. 194-195. 
"6 Metamorphoses, 7.19f., quoted by Zieslcr (Ziesler, 1989, p. 19o). 
- Zeisler, 1989, p. 190. 'R Ibid., p. 196.79 Ibid., pp. 190-191. 
ßo Ibid., pp. 192,199. Theissen, 1987, p. 183. ßZ Theissen, 1987, pp. 186-188. 
Verses 15 and 19 respectively s4 Verses 17-18 and 20 respectively. 
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For Theissen, Paul has described a'three tribunal' anthropological model, 
in which the tribunal of the `I' stands between the antagonistic tribunals 
of the law which points to God, and the law of sin. The law of God is 
represented in the mind, the law of sin in the `members' or the `flesh' of 
the person. The `I' stands between these two, being drawn in either one 
direction or the other. 85 
Theissen believes that, in 7: 14ff., Paul was drawing implicitly upon the 
classical Greek tradition of understanding the conflict between willing and 
doing. " On the one hand, this tradition represented affect, in the form 
of passion, sloth or pleasure, as the cause of evil, by means of its power 
to override reason. This is exemplified by Medea, who was portrayed by 
Euripides as having killed her children because of her desire for revenge, 
and who was understood by Ovid as caught in conflict between love for 
Jason and the voice of reason: `Some strange power holds me down against 
my will. Desire persuades me one way, reason another. I see the better and 
approve it, but I follow the worse. ', Seneca took this understanding a step 
further. Rather than portraying Medea's murder of her children as a conflict 
between passion and reason, he saw her as caught in a conflict between two 
emotions: love and anger. 
On the other hand, the tradition included an argument that evil is 
due, not to passion, but to ignorance. This was exemplified by Socrates 
and Epictetus, for whom human beings were understood to make rational 
choices, based upon knowledge and interpretation. According to Epictetus, 
Medea deceived herself in her decision to murder her children. She acted 
according to her understanding, but lacked proper understanding and thus 
acted wrongly. 
Theissen sees Paul as following in this tradition of reflection on the 
conflict between willing and doing. He argues that Paul inclines more 
towards the `affective' model of Euripides than to the `cognitive' model of 
Epictetus. For Paul, sin is the power which generates the conflict, but the 
flesh is the source of the passions which draw the subject away from right 
action. However, he sees Paul as going beyond tradition by virtue of his 
portrayal of two `normative systems' in conflict: the law of the flesh and 
the law of the mind. 
Theissen later proposes a correspondence between these three tribunals and the id, ego and superego 
of Freudian psychoanalytic thought (Theissen, 1987, p. 244). 
Theissen, 1987, pp. 211-221. 
Quoted by Theissen (Theissen. 1987. P. 217), from Ovid, A etamorpboses (with removal here of the 
interpolations of the original Latin text). 
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For Theissen, in 7: 7-23 Paul is engaged in relating `an inner dialogue 
that leads more and more deeply into a destructive self-condemnation'. 88 
Redemption is to be found in Christ, and is announced in 7: 24. It takes the 
form of life `in the Spirit', which is the subject of chapter 8, and the destruc- 
tive dialogue is thereby replaced by the constructive dialogue of 8: 31-39. gß 
The transformation is understood by Theissen in psychological terms, in 
which he takes in a broader view of chapters 7 and 8, understood according 
to learning theory, psychodynamic processes and cognitive restructuring. 9° 
Addiction as divided self 
At first sight, there would appear to be a very significant problem to be 
encountered by any application of Christian commentary on Romans 7: 14- 
25 to providing a theological account of the subjective experience of addic- 
tion. Namely, how can the conflict between pre-Christian and Christian 
interpretations be accommodated if this passage is taken to be descrip- 
tive of the subjective experience of addiction? Whichever interpretation is 
accepted, addiction is clearly not confined exclusively either to those who 
are not Christians or to those who are. ` It is encountered among people of 
every religious tradition, as well as among atheists and agnostics. 92 There- 
fore, if Cranfield and Dunn are correct in asserting that the experience 
described by Paul in Romans 7: 14-25 is a result of the work of the Holy 
Spirit in specifically Christian experience, or that it is initiated by entry of 
the Christian at conversion into the new epoch of Christ, how can it be 
descriptive of the experience of the Buddhist, atheist or agnostic alcoholic? 
Conversely, if Ziesler and Theissen are correct in their assertion that this 
passage describes a human predicament to which Christ is the solution, 
a predicament which Christians have therefore left behind, how can it be 
98 Ibid., pp. 26o-261.89 Ibid., p. 261. 
See ibid., pp. 222-265. A full discussion of this psychological analysis is beyond the scope of this book. 
However, Theissen portrays Christ as a 'learning model for overcoming normatively conditioned 
anxieties' (p. 226), a 'symbol of an integration of originally antagonistic tribunals' (p. 249), and 
a means of making possible a 'new interpretation of the human situation' (p. 263). He does not 
explore adequately, so far as this reader is concerned, the extent to which Christ may be understood 
as fulfilling these roles in a unique way, although to some extent this could be taken as implicit. The 
danger would appear to be that redemption is understood in a purely psychological sense, addressed 
primarily to the resolution of the inner conflict between willing and action. Theological discourse 
could thereby be understood as reduced entirely to the terms of secular discourse, and as adding 
nothing to it. I do not think that this is Theissen's intention, but the question remains of how this 
model of understanding Romans 7-8 may be seen to have unequivocally avoided such a conclusion. 
See, for example, Fichter, 1982. 
Although there are differences of prevalence between these groups (G. Edwards, Marshall and Cook, 




Addiction as sin and syndrome 143 
descriptive of the experience of the Christian alcoholic? Surely, according 
to either interpretation, we must conclude that Paul is describing a differ- 
ent kind of experience altogether? The divided self of Romans 7: 14-15 is 
therefore not a description of the experience of addiction; it is a description 
of another kind of experience - perhaps similar or analogous to addiction 
in some way - but actually confined either to Christian or non-Christian 
experience, according to one's assessment of the arguments presented by 
different commentators. 
While this argument may appear compelling in some ways, it does not 
withstand closer scrutiny. In particular, it might be argued that Cranfield, 
Dunn, Ziesler and Theissen are all somewhat too preoccupied with making 
a decision between the pre-Christian and Christian interpretations of the 
passage. Surely, the passage could be descriptive of both Christian and 
non-Christian experience? According to Paul, both Christians and non- 
Christians are caught up in the human experience of both positive and 
negative aspects of createdness in this world. Both have awµa and Qapý, 
body and `flesh', with all the good things and all the problems that this 
entails. Those who are outside Christ are not necessarily viewed by Paul as 
being without any moral awareness or sense of inner conflict. 93 Similarly, 
he has no illusions that Christians have automatically become sinless, 94 and 
indeed the continuing struggle with sin is inherent in the eschatological 
tension between the old and new epochs, within which Paul understands 
Christians as being involved. 
But is there a valid parallel between this passage and the subjective expe- 
rience of addiction? 
Dunn, Ziesler and Theissen all draw specific attention to the way in 
which the passage is concerned with the conflict between will and action. 
As far as will is concerned, Paul indicates that he can `will what is right' 
(v. 18), or `want' to do something (vv. 15,19), and then finds that he does 
not do it. Conversely, he can not want to do something (vv. 16,19, zo), or 
even `hate' something (v. 15), and then finds that he nevertheless does it. As 
far as action is concerned, Paul finds that he does not understand his own 
94 See, for example, the conflict alluded to in Romans 2: 14-15. Unfortunately, there is further debate 
here also! As far as our present commentators are concerned, Dunn clearly understands this passage as 
referring to non-Christian Gentiles (Dunn, 1988a, pp. 98-99, to5-1o6) whereas Cranfield concludes 
that the reference is to Gentile Christians (Cranfield, 1995, P" 50). 
See, for example, Romans 6: 12. Although for Ziesler (1989, p. 164) this is an anomaly, for according 
to his understanding we might expect Christians to be sinless and therefore to need no such advice, 
he clearly recognises that Paul actually does not expect this. He sees, rather, that the Christian now 
has the `possibility' of defeating sin. How he might reconcile this with his interpretation of 7: 14-25 
as applying only to pre-Christian experience is not entirely clear. If he sees Christians as no longer 
being under the 'power' of sin (p. 165), why do they sin at all? 
94 
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actions (v. 15), that he does what he does not want (vv. 15,16,19,20), and 
even does what he hates (v. 15). Conversely, he does not do what he wills to 
do (v. 18) and wants to do (vv. 15,19). All of this would certainly appear to 
be very similar indeed to the subjective experience of drinkers who want 
to stop drinking, but then find themselves drinking again, and who want 
to abstain, but find that they do not. 
The subjective compulsion of the alcohol dependence syndrome, how- 
ever, also incorporates the experience of craving or desire for alcohol. Is this 
also to be found in Romans 7: 14-25? At first, it would seem that the answer 
is clearly no. Whereas the alcohol-dependent person desires both to stop 
drinking, and also to resume or continue drinking, Paul speaks clearly of a 
desire to do what is right, but does not admit to a desire to do that which is 
evil. Perhaps, then, the subjective experience of Romans 7 is qualitatively 
different from that of alcohol dependence? Whereas Paul (assuming for a 
moment that he does write autobiographically) finds himself willing and 
wanting only one thing, the addict finds that he or she is torn between 
competing desires, which engender correspondingly competing wills to do 
different and opposite things. However, this cannot be a complete contrast 
with Romans 7, for verses 1-13 are concerned with desire (in the form of 
`sinful passions' in v. 5, and covetousness in vv. 7-13), and it will be recalled 
that Ziesler considered the possibility that Paul was in fact still talking 
about conflicting desires in verses 14-25. Similarly, Theissen considered 
that Paul's account of the divided self in verses 14-25 was influenced by the 
Greek tradition of conflict between affect and reason, or between conflict- 
ing affective states. His `three tribunal' model further postulates that the 
self stands between the antagonistic tribunals of the law of God and the law 
of sin, drawn in opposite directions by each. Furthermore, Cranfield and 
Dunn each portray Christians as being caught in a conflict or tension cre- 
ated by their experience of the power of sin. How is this power experienced, 
if not as an affective state or desire? 
The competing desires of the person caught up in the subjective experi- 
ence of alcohol dependence must actually be of different qualitative kinds. 
The rational desire to stop drinking is presumably based upon a recognition 
of the harm that drinking has caused (especially over a longer chronological 
perspective), a desire to be free of this harm, and a sense of what is recog- 
nised as `right' or necessary in the circumstances. The desire to continue 
drinking is presumably much more affective, or appetitive, and perhaps 
therefore more biological, in nature. It almost certainly includes a variety 
of components, such as the desire to relieve withdrawal symptoms, a desire 
to experience the short-term relief of anxiety or dysphoria, and a desire 
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for the positive subjective effects of alcohol intoxication. The discourse 
in Romans 7: 14-25 can similarly be understood as recognising competing 
desires of contrasting kinds. On the one hand is the more rational and 
explicit desire, expressed in the will to do that which is spiritual (v. 14), 
good (vv. 16,19,21), and according to the law of God (v. 22) or the `law 
of my mind' (v. 2.3). On the other hand is a more implicit desire, induced 
by the power of sin, and variously experienced as `slavery under sin' (v. 14), 
sin that dwells within me' (vv. 17,2o), evil that `lies close at hand' (v. 21), 
and `another law' which makes one `captive to the law of sin that dwells in 
my members' (v. 23). 
Understood in this way, Paul's theology of sin, and the subjective expe- 
rience of the divided self described in Romans 7: 14-25, would together 
appear to describe subjective phenomena very similar to those experienced 
as a part of the alcohol dependence syndrome. In other words, Paul's account 
of the struggle with sin would appear to be of a very similar nature to the 
subjective experiences of desire and compulsion which are associated with 
alcohol dependence. Both are concerned with the relationship between 
will and behaviour. Both acknowledge a tension within the self between 
that which is recognised as good, rational and delightful, on the one hand, 
and that which is recognised as `evil', contrary to reason and enslaving, 
on the other. Both acknowledge competing `desires' of different kinds: the 
one a more rational desire, and the other more affective, or perhaps even 
biological in nature. 
The strong similarities evident in this parallel between the subjective 
experience described in Romans 7 and the subjective experience of the 
alcohol dependence syndrome do not necessarily demonstrate that addic- 
tion can be reduced without remainder to a Pauline understanding of the 
inner conflict generated by the power of sin. (It almost certainly cannot. )95 
Neither do they necessarily mean that all human beings suffer from a `sin 
dependence syndrome'. However, they do clearly suggest that the relation- 
ship between sin and addiction is worthy of further exploration. They also 
suggest some important possible implications for a theological understand- 
ing of addiction. 
First, addiction may be concerned not so much with sins as with sin. It 
may be concerned not so much with freely made moral decisions as with a 
struggle against the power of sin. This power has a tendency to enslave, and 
to corrupt the attitudes, values and actions of individuals and of society. It is 
91A cursory consideration of the seven elements of the alcohol dependence syndrome would imme- 
diately suggest that tolerance, withdrawal symptoms, relief drinking and reinstatement, at the least, 
are without any direct or obvious parallel in the Pauline understanding. 
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not a power which affects only the addict or alcoholic. It has influence in the 
lives of all human beings. The plight of the alcoholic is at least very similar 
to the plight which we all share and in which we are all involved. This 
idea of a `power' of sin as implicated in the nature and origins of addiction 
offers a level of understanding of the experience of addiction which is 
not to be found in moral, disease or purely scientific models. Addiction 
is not concerned simply with freely made moral choices, and neither is it 
concerned purely with deterministic forces that act upon a helpless victim. 
It is concerned with an interplay of agent and environment in such a way 
that subjects experience themselves as `drawn into' an addictive pattern 
of behaviour for which they are neither entirely responsible, nor entirely 
without responsibility. This pattern of behaviour involves the whole person, 
in interaction with his or her social context. 
Secondly, addiction may be understood, like sin, as being essentially 
concerned with a personal attitude or orientation towards God. Because 
this assertion is based here upon a fundamental prior assumption of Pauline 
theology, at least insofar as sin is concerned, it is in no sense offered as 
evidence that the phenomenon of addiction can be understood only within 
a theistic framework. However, it does show that a context of relationship 
with God can offer an informative approach to understanding addiction. 
The inner conflict of addiction can be understood as concerned with a 
division of the self between openness to the grace and power of God in 
Christ, on the one hand, and openness to the power of sin, on the other 
hand. The former offers the possibility of freedom, whereas the latter offers 
only further entrapment in the addictive process. Self-reliance does not 
offer a solution, for it is the powerlessness of the self in the face of the 
power of sin that is at the root of the problem. 96 
Thirdly, because the power of sin cannot be conquered by the mind or 
will alone, we all stand in need of the grace of God ifwe are to be set free from 
our enslavement or captivity to it. What this means for the treatment of 
addiction will be discussed further, below. However, the danger of pursuing 
a heavily psychological understanding, such as that followed by Theissen, 
is that freedom from sin becomes ultimately a matter of psychological 
health, and redemption is to be found in psychotherapy (whether in the 
guise of Christian faith or in some other form). The danger of pursuing too 
It is of note that this is at the heart of the philosophy of the Twelve Step programme of AA, 
which emphasises both the need to recognise powerlessness over alcohol, and also the need to 
orientate life towards a Higher Power, or God. (See the Twelve Steps of AA, and especially the 
first three steps; for example, as quoted and discussed in G. Edwards, Marshall and Cook, 2oo3, 
PP. 300-303,3o6--307). 
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enthusiastically a heavily Christological understanding, such as that offered 
by Pauline theology, is that it might appear that freedom from addiction can 
be found only through Christian faith, whereas it is clear that psychological 
and other approaches are effective. ' The nature of this tension is not dis- 
similar to the tension between pre-Christian and Christian understandings 
of Romans 7. The one understanding, if over-emphasised, denies ongoing 
inner conflict in the Christian life, which is clearly not true to Christian 
experience. The other, if over-emphasised, fails to acknowledge the reality 
and similarity of the inner conflict experienced by non-Christians, and the 
uniqueness of the solution to this conflict that is offered by the grace of 
God in Christ. 
AN AUGUSTINIAN THEOLOGY OF SIN AND ADDICTION 
Augustine of Hippo understood a yearning (desiderium) for God as being 
at the heart of Christian faith. He wrote an extensive work on the Trinity, 
placed a high value on his understanding of the Christian community as 
the body of Christ, and was increasingly concerned during his lifetime with 
the proper interpretation of scripture. He was engaged in various religious 
controversies of his time and argued strongly in various writings against the 
Manichaeans, the Donatists and the Pelagians. 98 
Augustine understood that all things have been created by God from 
nothing (ex nihilo) and that, as God is good, all things must therefore be 
good: 
Because, therefore, no good things whether great or small, through whatever gra- 
dations of things, can exist except from God; but since every nature, so far as it 
is nature, is good, it follows that no nature can exist save from the most high and 
true God: because all things even not in the highest degree good, but related to 
the highest good, and again, because all good things, even those of most recent 
origin, which are far from the highest good, can have their existence only from the 
highest good. 19 
Sin, therefore, cannot be a desire for evil things as such, for no things 
which are evil by nature exist. Sin is, rather, concerned with the misuse of 
that which is good: 
"_ G. Edwards, Marshall and Crook, 2001, especially pp. 333-336- 
98 Cross and Livingstone, 1997, pp. 128-130. Brief biographical details have already been provided in 
Chapter 4, and will not be repeated here. 
99 Concerning the Nature of Good Against the Manicbacans. i. This, and other quotations here from 
Augustine's works, are (unless specified otherwise) taken from the Christian Classics Ethereal Library 
C[)-ROM, version 4. Calvin College, Grand Rapids. 
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Sin is not the striving after an evil nature, but the desertion of a better, and so the 
deed itself is evil, not the nature which the sinner uses amiss. For it is evil to use 
amiss that which is good. Whence the apostle reproves certain ones as condemned 
by divine judgment, `Who have worshipped and served the creature more than 
the Creator. "°° He does not reprove the creature, which he who should do would 
act injuriously towards the Creator, but those who, deserting the better, have used 
amiss the good. `°' 
Exactly when, in practice, the striving or desire for a lesser good constitutes 
sin is not entirely clear. The distinction may be concerned with justice, itself 
derived in turn from the edicts or laws of God; ultimately it is concerned 
with a turning away from God himself, a failure to love God. '°` The problem 
is thus not with the existence of evil things - for evil things as such do not 
`exist' - but with the inordinate desire of human beings for good but inferior 
things; in other words, a perversion of desire and will. '°; 
For Augustine, sin could be traced back to the rebellion against God of 
the Devil, and the disobedience of Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden, 
both acts representing freely made, sinful, choices motivated by pride. 104 
The latter act, in particular, was understood by Augustine as being the 
means by which humans acquired `original sin'. Original sin was in turn 
understood as a fundamental change in the human condition imposed 
by God as a punishment for the sin of Adam. This condition included 
mortality, pain, fatigability, disease, degeneration with age, and lust. It is 
a biological condition, genetically transmitted and innate to all human 
beings. '°5 Although it is not fundamentally an impairment of reasoning or 
will, '°6 it is reflected in bad judgements that human beings make, in habits 
that they develop, and in a disposition to misuse their free will. However, 
it is also a secondarily acquired condition. It is not fundamentally the way 
that God created things to be. 107 If sin has become our second nature, it is 
not our primary nature - which is still good. 1 ' 
McFadyen'°9 suggests that there are four corollaries of the doctrine of 
original sin. First, sin is a contingent but non-necessary consequence of 
free will. Secondly, sin is more concerned with an enduring human `con- 
dition' or `situation' than it is with individual sinful acts. Thirdly, sin is 
1O" Romans 1: 25.1O1 Concerning the Nature of*Good, Against the Manichaeans, 36. 
1O= Mann, 2002, PP. 45-46.1O; Mathewes, 2001, pp. 71,8o; Burnaby, 1991, p. 185. 
104 Mann, 2002, pp. 46-47. Pride is thus the ultimate origin of sin. See also Burnaby, 1991, p. 189. 
105 Mann, 2002, p. 47; McFadyen, 2000, pp. 16,189-1yo. However, it has been pointed out that 
the imposition of modern views of biology upon the thinking of Augustine is an anachronism 
(Mathewes, 2001, pp. 83-84). 
1O1` Mann, 2002, p. 47.1O' Mathewes, 2001, pp. 74-75. Ibid., p. 81. 
109 McFadyen, 2000, pp. 16-18. 
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communicated to human beings such that it is present from the very earliest 
stages of biological being, even before they are capable of self-determining 
(morally culpable) acts. It is an inheritance of a distortion of personhood 
and of alienation from God which incurs guilt. Fourthly, sin is a univer- 
sal human condition and experience. The last three of these corollaries in 
turn suggest that sin has ontological substance and that it is not primarily 
concerned with the exercise of human will, but is an inescapable aspect of 
human being. For many critics, both Christians and others, this renders it 
unacceptable on both scientific and ethical grounds: on scientific grounds, 
because the fall is understood as mythological, and on moral grounds, 
because of a consensus that ethics are concerned with free choices made by 
responsible, autonomous, personal agents. 
For Augustine, sin was identical neither with actions nor with will. Sinful 
actions were understood as willed. "' But willing was not to be understood 
as the neutral selection from available choices - actions are willed under the 
influence of affection and desire, and a motivation to pursue the good. " 
Furthermore, willing does not depend upon choice. It is possible to will 
an action, even where there is no choice. 112 For Augustine, freedom was 
not to be found in withholding oneself from God - for that would be to 
display pride and to demonstrate bondage to sin in the process of pursuing 
an inferior representation of the good. Freedom is to be found, therefore, 
only under the influence of the grace of God, the source of all goodness, 
where persons are so orientated towards God that their desire, volition and 
actions are brought into harmony. "; 
Original sin is associated in the work of Augustine with concupiscence. 
Concupiscence is a loss of control of the spirit over the flesh. '14Concu- 
piscence is concerned with the overpowering of the rational will by desire, 
and thus leads to the situation in which the will is `divided' in the face of 
competing desires. "' McFadyen writes: "Sins of concupiscence are conse- 
quently failures in willing actually to pursue that which one would; failures 
coherently and consistently to instantiate in practice the life-orientation 
consented to in faith. '"" In Augustine's understanding, the divided will is 
the result of concupiscence. Concupiscence is a disorder of desire which 
is partly biological and partly socially conferred. Even for those who are 
baptised, their personal history of habit and practice in relation to this dis- 
order of desire will ensure a continuing power and influence of it. But the 
grace of God, received through baptism, brings a person under the effects 
"" Ibid., Iý). tH,. "' Ibid., p. 17ý . 
"= Ibid., pp. 18o-194" Ibid. pp. 194-187. 
"4 Burnaby, t91t, h. 2o8. ". McFadyen, iooo, Ph. 190-194. nc Ibid., p. 192. 
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of a new power and influence - the grace of God - which disempowers 
concupiscence. The power of sin can no longer rule unchallenged, and thus 
the Christian is drawn in two directions. 117 
His interpretation of Paul's theology of grace was in fact fundamental to 
Augustine's understanding of sin and willing. He understood the necessity 
of God's grace for human salvation as implying that human beings were 
fundamentally flawed - that they could not desire or will that which is good 
without God's action upon them from outside themselves. Nonetheless, he 
still saw that goodness of the individual as being, in some sense, their own. "' 
For Augustine, the grace of God provided both a representation of perfect 
goodness and also the desire for it. " The grace of God thus brings about 
an orientation towards God such that desire and volition are integrated. 
Competing attractions are denied their capacity to motivate towards action. 
Only in this way, according to Augustine, can a person be truly said to be 
free. 120 
CONFESSIONS, BOOK VIII: THE DIVIDED WILL 
The text which has been selected for special attention here is book VIII 
of Augustine's Confessions. When Augustine wrote his Confessions, in about 
397 CE, he was both relating an autobiography of his conversion to Chris- 
tian faith from Manichaeism some eleven years earlier and also rebutting 
the arguments of the Manichees, whose radical dualism understood there 
to be not so much a divided will as two minds or substances at work within 
human experience. " He did this in a literary form which was almost with- 
out precedent, providing a compelling and inspiring account of the inner 
subjective experience of a man who strove relentlessly to find philosophical 
`` truth. 
In Confessions, Augustine presents himself as having lived a sinful life until 
the age of thirty-two years, at which time he was converted to Christianity. 
However, given his purpose in writing the book, and given his theology 
of grace and sin, it is quite possible that he tended to exaggerate his own 
sinfulness prior to conversion. He was clearly keen to persuade his readers 
that any sanctity he might have, and for which he had in fact gained quite 
a reputation, was attributable only to the grace of God. 123 
Book VIII of Confessions is concerned with Augustine's conversion to 
Christianity. The book opens with Augustine on the brink of conversion. 
Ibid., pp. 192-193. "g Ibid., pp. 173-176. See also Bernasconi, 1992, pp. 62-63. 
Ibid., pp. 179-180.12O Ibid., pp. 184-187. '2' Confessions, VIII, v, 22-24. 
O'Donnell, 2002, p. 20. "' Pine-Coffin, 1961, pp. 11-18. 
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It is his reluctance to embrace sexual continence which seems to hold 
him back. He relates how he was told the story of the conversion of the 
philosopher Victorinus, and how he was inspired to emulate him, but then 
found himself prevented: 
I was eager to imitate (Victorinusi ... 
for he had found a reason for giving his 
time wholly to thee. For this was what I was longing to do; but as yet I was hound 
by the iron chain of my own will. The enemy held fast my will, and had made of 
it a chain, and had hound me tight with it. For out of the perverse will came lust, 
and the service of lust ended in habit, and habit, not resisted, became necessity. By 
these links, as it were, forged together - which is why I called it 'a chain' -a hard 
bondage held me in slavery. But that new will which had begun to spring up in me 
freely to worship thee and to enjoy thee, 0 my God, the only certain joy, was not 
able as yet to overcome my former wilfulness, made strong by long indulgence. 
Thus my two wills - the old and the new, the carnal and the spiritual - were in 
conflict within me; and by their discord they tore my soul apart. ``4 
The obviously autobiographical nature and context of Augustine's account 
allows more clarity concerning the development of the divided will than 
does Paul's account of the divided self. Augustine tells us that he developed 
a new will, which was eager to imitate Victorinus. He perceived this as a 
joyful experience of freedom to worship God. But this new will came into 
conflict with an older will - initially described as `my own will'. This old 
will he perceived as `bondage' and `slavery', and as having been made strong 
by `habit' and `long indulgence'. The two wills are described as being in 
conflict: a conflict which Augustine portrays as the tearing apart of his soul. 
There need be no uncertainty here, as there was in interpreting Romans 
7. Augustine was reflecting on a time when he was almost, but not yet, a 
Christian. He was reflecting upon a new subjective experience - but one 
which was the outcome of a clash between new experiences, notably his 
hearing of the conversion of Victorinus, and long-established habits, which 
he now desired to change. 
The relationship between will and desire (or `lust') is also clear in this 
passage. Interestingly here, it is desire which arises from will in Augustine's 
understanding, rather than the other way around. However, it is also clear 
that it is the `service of lust' which leads to habit, and the failure to resist 
habit which leads to `necessity'. The sequence seems to be: will - desire - 
behaviour. Where actions are repeated, they lead to habit and a sense of 
compulsion. Where habit is resisted (implicitly by the will) that sense of 
compulsion may be broken. 
124 (; nýr/ýssinrtý. Vlll. %.. to. 
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Augustine interpreted his experience in the light of scripture, quoting 
specifically from two of Paul's letters. 12' First, he refers to Galatians (5: 17), 
as a basis for interpreting his experience in terms of conflicting desires: 
Thus I came to understand from my own experience what I had read, how `the 
flesh lusts against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh. '1" I truly lusted both 
ways, yet more in that which I approved in myself than in that which I disapproved 
in myself. For in the latter it was not now really I that was involved, because here 
I was rather an unwilling sufferer than a willing actor. And yet it was through me 
that habit had become an armed enemy against me, because I had willingly come 
to be what I unwillingly found myself to be. '27 
Augustine thus recognised that he desired both to imitate Victorinus and 
also to remain in his old way of life. He approved of the former desire, 
which he estimated to be the stronger, but disapproved of the latter. He is 
now ready to identify the latter desire as `not now really I', on the basis that 
he was an `unwilling sufferer' of that desire, although he recognised that he 
had played a willing role in bringing it to be. However, the desire to imitate 
Victorinus is identified with the desire of `the Spirit' in Galatians 5: 17, and 
the desire to remain in his old way of life is identified with `the flesh'. In 
the present context, it is important to note that in Galatians 5: 19-21 Paul 
lists a number of works of the flesh, and that they include drunkenness. 
For Augustine, the Pauline concept of `the flesh' was concerned with living 
for self rather than for God. 121 
Secondly, Augustine refers to Paul's letter to the Romans (7: 22-25) as a 
basis for interpreting his experience as one of captivity of the will: 
In vain did I 'delight in thy law in the inner man' while'another law in my members 
warred against the law of my mind and brought me into captivity to the law of sin 
which is in my members. ' For the law of sin is the tyranny of habit, by which the 
mind is drawn and held, even against its will. Yet it deserves to be so held because 
it so willingly falls into the habit. '0 wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver 






Augustine also quotes (in VIII, v, 12) from Ephesians 5: 14: Awake, you who sleep, and arise from 
the dead, and Christ shall give you light. ' This quotation appears to reflect his understanding of 
the challenge to 'awake' and 'arise' and receive `light' that was presented by his hearing of the 
conversion of Victorinus. Our concern here, however, is more with Augustine's interpretation of 
the inner conflict in which he found himself involved as a result of this challenge. 
In the NRSV, Galatians 5: i7 reads: 'For what the flesh desires is opposed to the Spirit, and what 
the Spirit desires is opposed to the flesh: for these are opposed to each other, to prevent you from 
doing what you want. ' 
Confessions, VIII, v, n. This is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
C onfession. c. VIII. v. 12. 
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Augustine particularly draws here on Paul's tension between the law of 
God in the inner man (or mind), and the law of sin in his `members'. He 
explicitly understands the latter law as the `tyranny of habit' which brings 
the mind into captivity against its own will. It is easy to assume here that 
he conceives of the law of sin as operating at the level of purely bodily 
desire (in the `members'), but things cannot be this simple, for he clearly 
recognises that this `tyranny' was willingly entered into. In other words, 
the will is brought into captivity by means of its own complicity with, and 
failure to resist, the formation of habit. 
Augustine goes on to relate how he was told of the conversion of two 
agents of the Emperor, '; ' and how this threw him into a state of turmoil 
and self-loathing. '; ' This led him eventually to a further description of the 
inner conflict that he experienced: 
The mind commands the mind to will, and yet though it be itself it does not 
obey itself. Whence this strange anomaly and why should it be? I repeat: The will 
commands itself to will, and could not give the command unless it wills; yet what 
is commanded is not done. But actually the will does not will entirely; therefore 
it does not command entirely. For as far as it wills, it commands. And as far as 
it does not will, the thing commanded is not done. For the will commands that 
there be an act of will - not another, but itself. But it does not command entirely. 
Therefore, what is commanded does not happen: for if the will were whole and 
entire, it would not even command it to he, because it would already be. It is, 
therefore, no strange anomaly partly to will and partly to be unwilling. This is 
actually an infirmity of mind, which cannot wholly rise, while pressed down by 
habit, even though it is supported by the truth. And so there are two wills, because 
one of them is not whole, and what is present in this one is lacking in the other. "2 
It becomes clear here that Augustine understood himself as possessing two 
wills in opposition to each other. The one will commanded that his mind 
should will that he follow the example of Victorinus. This was evident in 
his consciousness of `commanding' himself to do the same. The other will 
was his unwillingness to follow Victorinus. This was evident in the fact 
that the `command' was not actually obeyed. He understands this state of 
affairs as reflecting an `infirmity of mind' in which there are two partial 
wills, neither of which is `entire' or 'whole'. 
However, this interpretation does not seem to do full justice to the 
subjective state that Augustine describes here, for he also puts most of the 
emphasis on one of these wills, in such a way that only one is referred to 
here as a will as such, and the other is an unwillingness to implement it. 
140 C. onfrssions. VIII. vi. tc. '+' Conftcsions. VIII, vii. 16-18. 'i' Con%ssions, VIII, ix, 21. 
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It is really the one will with which Augustine is most concerned, which 
is `supported by the truth' but `pressed down by habit'. It is true that, 
owing to the latter influence, it is only a `partial' will, which commands 
something that does not happen. If it were a complete will, the command 
to follow Victorinus would be implemented, and there would be only one 
will, where will and action were one and the same. The will would then 
not `command' itself at all - for what was willed would simply happen. 
However, because it is only a partial will, the will finds itself commanding 
itself to do something, which does not happen. This understanding has close 
parallels with Harry Frankfurt's'33 distinction between first- and second- 
order volitions (or desires), where Augustine's will to follow Victorinus 
might be understood as a second-order volition, and his unwillingness to 
do so as a first-order volition to remain in his old way of life. This model 
will be discussed further below. 
Augustine continued to describe his state of inner conflict as both partial 
willingness and partial unwillingness. He recognised, on the one hand, that 
willingness and unwillingness were both aspects of his own mind and self, 
such that he was `at war' with himself and `torn apart'. But, on the other 
hand, and with further allusions to Romans 7 (this time to v. 17), he 
understood the unwillingness as being no longer himself, but rather the 
`sin that dwelt in [him]': 
While I was deliberating whether I would serve the Lord my God now, as I had 
long purposed to do, it was I who willed and it was also I who was unwilling. In 
either case, it was I. I neither willed with my whole will nor was I wholly unwilling. 
And so I was at war with myself and torn apart by myself. And this strife was against 
my will; yet it did not show the presence of another mind, but the punishment 
of my own. Thus it was no more I who did it, but the sin that dwelt in me - the 
punishment of a sin freely committed by Adam, and I was a son of Adam. '34 
There is a clear implication here of the effects of original sin - the `punish- 
ment of a sin freely committed by Adam' - which now exerted its influence 
upon Augustine, such that he did not do that which he wanted to do. 
With further echoes of the Pauline understanding of the Christian as 
caught in a tension between two epochs, or powers, Augustine summarised 
his own state of conflict in more general terms: 
When eternity attracts us from above, and the pleasure of earthly delight pulls us 
down from below, the soul does not will either the one or the other with all its 
force, but still it is the same soul that does not will this or that with a united will, 
'' Stump, 2002, pp. 126-127. 'i4 Confessions, VIII, x, 2z. 
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and is therefore pulled apart with grievous perplexities, because for truth's sake it 
prefers this, but for custom's sake it does not lay that aside. '35 
Augustine therefore saw himself, along with all human beings who are 
attracted by `eternity ... 
from above', as being drawn into a state of inner 
conflict generated by a tension between that force of heavenly attraction 
and an opposing force from below'. The force from above was represented 
for Augustine by the life that Victorinus had adopted -a life given wholly 
to God. The force from below seems to have much in common with 
Paul's understanding of `the flesh', but it is concerned also with Augustine's 
doctrine of original sin, and further with the influence of a lifetime of 
`habit' which binds people to ways of life that they might (at least partially) 
wish to break away from. 
It may be argued that Augustine saw the will as not so much divided as 
`partial', or incomplete, or held captive. Or again, it may be argued that he 
saw the inner conflict generated within people as a result of the competing 
attractions of `eternity' and `earthly delight' as being concerned with two 
conflicting wills, or perhaps between willingness and unwillingness. How- 
ever, overall, Augustine's understanding of the will in the state of inner 
conflict associated with his desire to give his life wholly to God, as Victor- 
inus had done, would seem to be well described as being a `divided will', 
and it is this term which will be used here. 
Whatever terminology one may wish to use, it is clear that this state 
of inner conflict was associated, at least in Augustine's experience, with 
a strong affective component. Distraught, he went aside to weep, alone, 
beneath a fig tree in a garden. It was then that he heard a child playing, and 
chanting: `Pick it up, read it; pick it up, read it. '136 Interpreting this as a 
divine command to read scripture, he picked up a Bible and read Romans 
13: 13: 
I snatched it up, opened it, and in silence read the paragraph on which my eyes 
first fell: 'Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not 
in strife and envying, but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for 
the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof. ' I wanted to read no further, nor did I need to. 
For instantly, as the sentence ended, there was infused in my heart something like 
the light of full certainty and all the gloom of doubt vanished away. 13 
Thus, book VIII of Confessions concludes with Augustine's conversion to 
faith in Christ. 
"I Confessions, VIII. X. 24. t; 
6 Confkssions, VIII2xii, 29. "' Ibid. 
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Addiction as divided will 
Eleonore Stump, "' and others, have interpreted Augustine's understanding 
of the divided will in terms of Frankfurt's distinction between first- and 
second-order desires and volitions. First-order desires are simply `desires to 
do or not to do one thing or another'. Second-order desires are concerned 
with wanting `to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives'. Second- 
order desires thus require a capacity for `reflective self-evaluation'. 139 For 
Frankfurt, the will is understood as `effective desire', and is thus a desire 
expressed in motivation for action. '4° A first-order volition is an action or 
intention to action motivated by a first-order desire. A second-order volition 
is concerned, however, with wanting a particular first-order desire to be the 
will, whether or not it actually is, and it is this which, for Frankfurt, is 
essential to the concept of personhood. '4' According to this understanding, 
Augustine's awareness of the will commanding itself'42 was a description 
of a second-order volition. According to this understanding also, the will 
may variously be divided against itself - at first or second-order levels, or 
between first- and second-order levels. '43 
Both Stump and Frankfurt provide examples concerned with addiction, 
and indeed addiction appears to provide the almost quintessential example 
of conflict between first- and second-order volitions. 
For Frankfurt, '44 the narcotic addict may have first-order desires both 
to take the drug, and not to take it. The former is in both cases, more or 
less, generated by physiological dependency upon the drug. The `unwilling 
addict', however, also has a second-order volition to stop taking the drug, 
and therefore identifies self with this first-order desire, while withdrawing 
from the first-order desire to continue using the drug: 
It is in virtue of this identification and withdrawal, accomplished through the 
formation of a second order volition, that the unwilling addict may meaningfully 
make the analytically puzzling statements that the force moving him to take the 
drug is a force other than his own, and that it is not of his own free will but rather 
against his will that this force moves him to take it. '45 
Frankfurt contrasts the `unwilling addict' with the `wanton addict'. The lat- 
ter lacks either the capacity or interest for evaluating desires self-reflectively. 
In the case of the wanton addict, whichever first-order desire is stronger 
will win but, whichever desire does win, this addict will have no personal 
sense of winning or losing a struggle at all. Indeed, according to Frankfurt, 
"g Stump, 2002, pp. 126-127. "9 Frankfurt, 1971, p. 7.140 Ibid., p. R. 
14' Ibid., p. 10.142 Conf? ssions, VIII, ix. '44 Stump, 2002, p. 126. 
'4ti Frankfurt, 1971, PP. 12-14.141 Ibid., p. 13. 
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the wanton addict does not have the characteristics of a person at all. How- 
ever, Frankfurt also considers the possibility of a third type of addict: the 
`willing addict'. The willing addict has both a second-order volition and 
a first-order volition to take the drug. According to Frankfurt, it is there- 
fore possible to understand a personal state of addiction in which first- 
and second-order desires do not come into conflict, and in which the will 
is therefore not divided. 
Frankfurt's proposition of the willing addict is actually put forward in the 
course of an argument concerning freedom of the will, and it presupposes 
that there are no first-order volitions to discontinue drug use which might 
provide a source of conflict with the second-order volition to continue drug 
use. In fact, research on the alcohol dependence syndrome makes clear that 
such first-order volitions almost certainly will arise, since psychological, 
social and biological harm associated with the dependent pattern of use is 
likely to motivate cessation of drug use, or at least reduction of use. However, 
the phenomenon of salience (as an element of the dependence syndrome) 
reflects the observation that all types of addicts (willing, unwilling or wan- 
ton) do in fact tend to implement first-order volitions to continue drug 
use despite first-order volitions to discontinue. It would therefore appear 
likely in practice that established addiction will be associated with at least a 
degree of division of the will, both at the level of competing first-order voli- 
tions, and between the levels of first- and second-order volitions, whether 
an addict is willing or unwilling. However, it remains possible that the 
willing addict may experience no such internal conflict. Such a possibility 
may in fact be realised relatively frequently in the early stages of develop- 
ment of the dependence syndrome, when first-order volitions to reduce or 
discontinue drug use may be less frequently encountered. But, as Frank- 
furt suggests, this is in fact a state of `overdetermination' of the first-order 
desire for drug use. '4' This would seem likely to reinforce the dependent 
pattern of drug use, and thus pave the way for a later conflict between first- 
and second-order volitions if and when the second-order volition should 
change from that of a 'willing' to that of an 'unwilling' addict. It is also 
highly consonant with Augustine's understanding, both of the willingness 
of the self in generation of the internal conflict, and of the part played by 
habit. Recall, for example, his statement that 
the law of sin is the tyranny of habit, by which the mind is drawn and held, even 
against its will. Yet it deserves to be so held because it so willingly falls into the 
habit. 14- 
141' Ibid., pt). i, )-2o. 'a' C, oufPw'nn.,. VIII. V. tz. 
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Stump provides a very similar example of addiction, concerned with a 
smoker who wants to give up smoking. 148Again, there is a powerful first- 
order volition, this time to continue smoking, in conflict with a second- 
order volition to stop. However, Stump's purpose in analysing this example 
is different from Frankfurt's. In particular, she is concerned primarily with 
resolving the tension between grace and free will in Augustine's thought. 
The question here is about where the second-order volition of faith might 
arise from. Is it implanted as an act of God, by grace, and therefore not 
ultimately an act of will of the individual at all, or is it an act of free will of 
the individual? This is a fundamental problem in Augustine's work, where 
it would seem that he wishes to insist both that the grace of God is the sole 
source of human goodness and faith, and also that human beings have free 
will and thus responsibility for the evil that they commit. 
Stump considers the imaginative possibilities of a technical device which 
might be operated by the smoker, so as to bring about a first-order volition 
not to smoke, or a neurosurgeon who might be able to perform an operation 
with the same effect. In either case, where the device is active at the smoker's 
behest, or the operation is undertaken only with the smoker's consent, it 
may be argued that the ultimate determinant of the outcome is the free 
will of the individual concerned. '49 The device is arguably not dissimilar 
to the action of certain `anti-craving' drugs which are currently the subject 
of research in the field of alcohol dependence. 15° 
Stump argues that Augustine understands God as willing to give grace 
to those who ask in such a way that God is analogous to the technical 
device or the neurosurgeon. '5' In this way, Augustine's understanding of 
the necessity of the grace of God might appear to have been retained along 
with an understanding of the free will of the individual in asking for that 
grace. However, the problem simply recurs at the level of the second-order 
volition. If the second-order volition is also given by God, human free will 
would appear to be only illusory. 
A full analysis of this problem is not directly relevant to the pur- 





Stump, 2002, pp. 127-130. 
This assumes, of course, that causal determinism is rejected, and that the possibility of indeterminate 
actions resulting from the exercise of free will is accepted. 
E. g. Acamprosate and naltrexone (G. Edwards, Marshall and Cook, 2003, pp. 328-331). The device is 
also not dissimilar to another pharmacological treatment for alcohol dependence, namely disulfiram. 
Disulfiram confers an aversive response when alcohol is consumed, and thus assists patients in 
maintaining abstinence. A decision to take disulfiram is thus a second-order volition, but the drug 
does not reduce craving and therefore does not actually remove the first-order desire to drink. (See 
review: Hughes and Cook, 1997. ) 
Stump, 2002, p. 133. 
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understanding of the nature of the relationship between grace and free will 
in any theological response to the problem of addiction. If the divided 
will of Augustine's experience in coming to Christian faith is in principle 
the same as the divided will of the addicted person, what does this mean 
for our understanding of the latter? More specifically, is the addict, ulti- 
mately, dependent only upon the grace of God for freedom from this state 
of conflict or captivity, or does personal choice and free will also play a part? 
First, it is surely now clear that a second-order volition to stop drinking, 
smoking, drug use, or any other addictive pattern of behaviour, would 
appear to be essential if a pattern of addictive behaviour is to be broken. 
The `willing addict' that Frankfurt envisaged would seem very unlikely 
indeed ever to change his or her addictive behaviour. One could perhaps 
imagine strong first-order volitions which might develop, perhaps as a 
result of the biological, psychological and social harms of drinking, which 
might set up a division of the will between a second-order volition to 
continue drinking and a first-order volition to stop. Indeed, such cases 
are sometimes encountered in clinical practice. However, the prognosis 
in such cases (from the perspective of abstinence as a `good' outcome) 
is, in my experience, usually poor. The will is divided not only between 
first- and second-order volitions, but also at the level of opposing first- 
order divisions. The addictive behaviour is strongly over-determined and 
is unlikely to change, except perhaps on a temporary basis. 
Secondly, any solution to the problem of addiction must take account 
of the seriousness of the internal conflict which the divided will represents. 
If it were easy, of one's own volition, to break free from this experience of 
conflict, incompleteness and captivity of the will, it would not represent 
the source of turmoil that it clearly presented to Augustine and which 
it similarly presents to the addict. As Augustine so vividly portrays, and 
as Frankfurt so logically argues, the will to adhere to familiar patterns 
of behaviour, reinforced by habit, and made all the more compelling by 
physiological processes that strengthen desire, can be a formidable obstacle 
to behavioural change. But is this the only obstacle, or is this obstacle 
adequately understood in this way alone? 
Thirdly, then, the analysis of Frankfurt, orientated as it is towards a con- 
cern with philosophical issues of personhood and free will, surely neglects 
important aspects of Augustine's theology. In book VIII of Confessions, 
Augustine is preoccupied with a Pauline tension between the `flesh' and the 
`Spirit', the competing powers of the `law of sin' and God's law, and the com- 
peting attractions of `eternity' and `earthly delight'. He understands human 
beings as suffering the consequences of original sin, such that without 
16o Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics 
the grace of God they are caught in a subjective experience of being unable 
to break free from the power of sin, habit and earthly delight. Or - for our 
present purposes - individuals caught in a pattern of addictive behaviour 
find that they need more than just their own willpower if they are to break 
free. 
Fourthly, Stump proposes a possible solution to Augustine's dilemma 
concerning libertarianism and grace, which is understood in terms of an 
analysis of the options available to human beings in response to the grace 
that God offers. '52 She suggests that refusal and assent are only two possi- 
bilities, and that it is also open to human beings to adopt a neutral position 
of non-refusal and non-assent. If we understand human beings as being 
normally in a state of continuous refusal of grace, by virtue of original sin, 
then they might still be able to cease refusing grace, and thus receive it, 
even though they are otherwise unable to actively request it or assent to it. 
Thus, the second-order volition of faith might be understood as entirely 
the gift of God, but also dependent upon the free will of an individual to 
cease refusing it. Perhaps a similar understanding might be helpful in the 
specific case of addiction? 
If we imagine that the addict is positively held, or attracted in some way, 
not just by a neutral choice between first-order desires, but by a nature 
which is in some way biased against the very thing that a second-order 
volition ought to choose - both for the longer-term benefit of the self, 
and for the benefit of others who suffer as a result of the addiction - we 
come closer both to the experience of addiction and to Augustine's account 
of the divided will. For Augustine, this division, captivity or incomplete- 
ness of the will could be mended only by the grace of God. For many 
alcoholics who follow the Twelve Step programme of Alcoholics Anony- 
mous (AA), experience has suggested that it can be mended only by a 
`Power greater than [them]selves'. `53 In either case, it was not so much 
that a first-order volition was suddenly made in favour of freedom, as 
that the individual (Augustine or the alcoholic respectively) ceased mak- 
ing a second-order volition to continue in their existing way of life. Thus, 
Augustine became open to a second-order volition of faith, conferred by the 
grace of God. Thus the alcoholic becomes open to a second-order volition 
for abstinence, conferred (using the language of AA) by a Power greater 
than self. '54 
" Ibid., pp. 139-142. 
'Si The second step of the Twelve Steps of AA (G. Edwards, Marshall and Cook, 2003, p. 302). 
"4 The third of the Twelve Steps of AA refers to the making of 'a decision to turn our will and our 
lives over to the care of God' (G. Edwards, Marshall and Cook, 2004, V. 102). 
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It would therefore appear to be the case that Augustine's experience 
of the divided (or captive or incomplete) will shows strong parallels with 
the subjective experience of addiction. Indeed, if we accept the analyses 
of Frankfurt and Stump, both Augustine's experience of struggling with 
the decision to adopt sexual continence in order to give his life wholly to 
God, and the experience of the alcoholic struggling to stop drinking, are 
identical experiences of inner conflict between first- and second-order voli- 
tions. Furthermore, in his understanding of the significance of the words 
of Romans 13: 13, Augustine himself seems implicitly to have recognised 
that his struggle with sexual desire was similar to a desire for drunkenness, 
although the latter was not a desire with which he struggled. But is there 
not also an important difference? Augustine was concerned primarily with 
a spiritual and religious decision (whether or not to become a Christian), 
which had behavioural and psycho-social implications (celibacy). The alco- 
holic is concerned primarily with a behavioural decision (whether or not to 
abstain), which has bio-psycho-social implications (withdrawal symptoms, 
craving, stigma, etc. ). These decisions are of a qualitatively different kind, 
and present different challenges. 
For a decision to convert to Christianity, a theology of grace might well be 
an essential part of the healing of a divided will. But is it equally necessary in 
the case of alcoholism? Are pharmacological and psychological treatments, 
informed by the natural, behavioural and social sciences, not sufficient? 
For Augustine, the distinction here would be quite unrecognisable. The 
initial psychological barrier to his conversion seems to have been primarily 
concerned with his desire for sexual fulfilment. But, for him, this was lit- 
tle different from other desires of the flesh, including drunkenness, which 
might equally have held him back from giving his life wholly to God. Sim- 
ilarly, all such desires ultimately present the same challenge. Will life be 
fulfilled by striving for the highest good, or will it be subject to concupis- 
cence, and thus characterised by a divided, captive, will? For Augustine, 
the solution to this dilemma was to be found in the grace of God, which 
alone provided a route to freedom. 
For contemporary clinicians, social scientists, neuroscientists, counsel- 
lors and psychotherapists in western society, however, the distinction is very 
recognisable indeed. Religion has been relegated to the private domain, and 
theology is not admitted to participation in secular discourse on such mat- 
ters. Conversion to Christianity and therapy for alcohol dependence are 
either completely unrelated matters, or at least should be addressed in differ- 
ent conversations, according to different rules. The former is the province 
of those who constitute a community of faith, and the latter the province of 
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those who constitute the community of science. The latter can be addressed 
without addressing the former, and vice versa. Scientific outcome studies 
would appear to support this contention. Therapies of various kinds are 
apparently equally successful as treatments for alcohol dependence, and 
Christian faith does not appear to be an essential prerequisite for a good 
outcome. 
However, the distinction that Augustine fails to recognise, and that post- 
Enlightenment western society insists upon, is perhaps more real than the 
former could have realised, and more illusory than the latter cares to allow. 
For embodied persons such as human beings, the neurochemistry of 
craving, lust and other biological drives is a very significant consideration 
indeed, about which Augustine can have suspected little and known noth- 
ing. Where `anti-craving' drugs offer a therapeutic opportunity to modify or 
eliminate such drives, they offer an opportunity for at least partial freedom 
for a captive will. Similarly, psychological treatments such as motivational 
interviewing might be understood to be offering support for fragile first- or 
second-order volitions for abstinence or moderation. In this sense, we might 
wish to reverse Stump's analogy, and suggest that such treatments are anal- 
ogous to the part played by God in Augustine's conversion, rather than 
the other way around. They are certainly, however, at least in a limited 
sense, a means of grace. They offer an opportunity of freedom which indi- 
viduals could not have achieved for themselves, which is based upon the 
intervention of an external (therapeutic) power. But all such interventions 
are focussed only on the solution to a particular problem - that of alco- 
hol dependence. They do not offer any broader understanding of what it 
means to be a creature with a divided will' - or (in Frankfurt's terms) what 
it means to be a `person'. 
But, on the other hand, the phenomenon of addiction may be much 
more closely related to a broader human experience of division of the will 
and thus (if Frankfurt is correct) personhood than many contemporary 
scientists and therapists might readily admit. From this perspective, a focus 
upon addiction as somehow apart from `normal' human experience may be 
very unhelpful. Perhaps addiction is, after all, simply one example of the 
many and varied ways in which different human beings struggle with a sense 
of wishing to be something other (or rather better) than that which they 
actually find themselves to be. And if this struggle is, after all, as Augustine 
suggested in relation to his own experience, ultimately therefore a personal 
struggle for the highest good, it is necessarily also a religious, or at least 
spiritual, matter and not a purely scientific one. In this case, the nature of the 
struggle itself, the very recognition of the division, captivity and limitations 
Addiction as sin and syndrome 163 
of the human will, would appear to beg the assistance of all that is ultimately 
good in achieving that which is personally the highest achievable good. In 
other words, the nature of the struggle implicitly recognises the need for 
grace as the means of finding freedom and wholeness. 
DEPENDENCE AND SIN: TOWARDS A THEOLOGICAL 
MODEL OF ADDICTION 
Having, in Chapter 2, briefly reviewed the alcohol dependence syndrome 
as a scientific interpretation of the concept of addiction, and having in this 
chapter considered the ways in which Pauline and Augustinian theologies 
(as exemplified in two selected texts) might shed light upon the subjective 
experience of addiction, what may we now say about the possibilities for a 
Christian theological model of addiction? 
A theological model is not a resurrection of the moral model. ' 
Although drunkenness has always been understood as an ethical concern 
of the Christian tradition, the moral model of addiction has suffered from 
unhelpful emphases and diverse interpretations. The most unhelpful per- 
ceived emphasis would appear to be in placing the blame mostly or entirely 
upon the individual drinker, as though it were a simple matter of `telling 
[other] people not to do it'. This approach does not do justice to the 
complexity of this bio-psycho-social problem, and neither does it show 
understanding of, or sympathy for, the subjective plight of the drinker 
who suffers from the alcohol dependence syndrome. However, it is also 
extremely unfortunate that the notion of a `moral model' has become so 
unpopular in relation to a contemporary social problem which has enor- 
mous ethical implications - not merely on the part of the individual 
drinker, 
but in terms of the whole context of the production, sale and consumption 
of alcohol, and the consequences of the same, within society as a whole. A 
more sophisticated ethical analysis of this complex system is, in the view of 
the present author, urgently needed. 
This chapter does not provide that analysis, at least not comprehensively, 
and it is not an attempt to reintroduce the old moral model. Indeed, it 
suggests that a model which conceives of either morality or addiction as 
being concerned simply with freely made choices on the part of an impartial 
moral agent is simply unrealistic. However, it does seek to explore some of 
the possibilities for constructing a Christian theological model of addiction. 
This in turn is of potentially great importance for a Christian ethical analysis 
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of this serious contemporary problem. A theological model of addiction is 
not at all the same thing as the old moral model - but it certainly does offer 
an important contribution to moral and ethical debate. 
Recognition of the contribution qf theology to discourse on addiction 
Over a period of almost eighteen centuries, Christian theology came to 
provide one of the main foundations for understanding the problem of 
drunkenness in western society. Over the last century, theology has been 
largely excluded from public discourse on alcohol-related matters, but it 
is argued here that theology still has a significant contribution to make to 
discourse about addiction. Addiction is concerned with some fundamental 
aspects of human experience with which Christian theology is also con- 
cerned. As with McFadyen's analysis of the Holocaust and the sexual abuse 
of children, theology also offers both descriptive and explanatory power. 
This is particularly evident in terms of the Pauline account of the divided 
self, and the Augustinian account of the divided will, both of which show 
significant parallels with the subjective experience of addiction. The Pauline 
and Augustinian accounts emphasise aspects of the experience of addiction 
that have been neglected, or only partially explained, in secular discourse. In 
particular, theology draws attention to aspects of addiction which relate to 
universal human experiences of self-reflection, internal conflict and choice. 
It sets these considerations in a broader, theistic, context and shows how 
such experiences are not properly understood in terms either of causal 
determinism or of completely free human agents who make completely 
free, self-determined choices. 
Recognition of addiction as one manifestation of the human condition 
While the alcohol-dependent person may have experienced cravings, 
withdrawal symptoms, affective states or other `pathological' experiences, 
the model that is suggested by the present exploration of Pauline and 
Augustinian theology is not that of the uniqueness of the subjective expe- 
rience of addiction so much as that of its universality. In other words, there 
are aspects of the subjective experience of addiction which are common to 
the human experience of personhood. In particular, human persons have 
a capacity to be self-reflective and to will to change, but also experience 
a power of resistance to that change which appears as though contrary to 
their own will. 
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Does this mean that addiction does not constitute any kind of disorder 
or disease at all? It is certainly difficult to see how, in theological terms, it 
can be construed as qualitatively different from the normal range of human 
experience. However, that is not to say that there are not important scien- 
tific discriminators. Just as personality disorders are understood as matters 
of clinical concern, representing as they do the statistical extremes of nor- 
mal human personality traits, even though they may not strictly be diseases 
or illnesses at all, '" perhaps addictive disorders are at least disorders in some 
statistical and scientific sense. However, the danger in this argument lies 
in Frankfurt's contention that secondary volitions are distinctive to per- 
sonhood. This argument might, therefore, make it appear as though some 
people are more fully people than others (as indeed Frankfurt's discussion 
of the wanton addict does appear to be in danger of implying). 
Perhaps the difference, therefore, lies not so much in fundamental qual- 
itative or quantitative differences between the subjective inner conflict of 
addiction as compared with the similar inner conflicts experienced by Paul, 
Augustine and others, but rather in the focus and scope of the conflict(s). 
As discussed briefly above, individual differences in the ways in which 
subjective desires such as lust or craving for alcohol are mediated at the 
neurochemical level may be more important in determining the nature 
and range of subjective human experience than Augustine or Paul ever 
could have imagined. However, both Paul and Augustine do appear to have 
recognised a range of difference vices as being essentially manifestations of 
the same underlying weakness of the flesh (e. g. the `revelling and drunk- 
enness ... 
debauchery and licentiousness... quarrelling and jealousy' of 
Romans 13: 13). This leaves much scope to understand environmental and 
genetic differences which might make different individuals more or less 
vulnerable to internal conflict in some areas than in others (e. g. to alcohol 
dependence rather than quarrelling, or to nicotine dependence rather than 
sexual licentiousness). 
It may therefore be the case, not so much that addiction is the universal 
human condition (as, for example, Lenters's6 would have us believe), as 
that the subjective experience of division of will and self is universal, and 
is experienced in different ways by different people. For one person it 
may be experienced in the domain of a struggle with alcohol dependence, 
and for another (as, perhaps, with Augustine) in the domain of grappling 
with sexual desire. For one person, the struggle may in some sense be 
identified as `addiction' (traditionally this would have been by virtue of drug 
"1 P. Hill, Murray and Thorley, 1987, pp. 197-198. " See Chapter z, pp. 18-19. 
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dependence) and in another it might not be (e. g. the habitual quarreller). 
In some cases, biological predisposition might be strong, and biological 
features of tolerance and withdrawal might be predominant (e. g. in alcohol 
dependence) and in other cases, the pattern of behaviour might appear 
much more psychological in both aetiology and presentation (e. g. in forms 
of behaviour such as `pathological shopping'). "" In other cases (e. g. sexual 
behaviour) it might be much more debatable whether to construe the 
struggle as a behavioural `addiction' or simply as habitual behaviour. 
Perhaps the key lesson here is that we may all identify with the essential 
subjective experience of addiction in one area of our lives or another, but 
that this does not mean to say that we are all `addicted' in any scientific or 
sociological sense. The universality of the human experience is such that 
none of us should feel able to look down on the addict, as though we were 
morally superior. On the other hand, this understanding does not construe 
addiction (in any scientific or sociological sense) as being a universal human 
disorder. Not everyone suffers from the alcohol dependence syndrome - or 
indeed any dependence syndrome at all. 
Pauline and Augustinian understandings of the power of sin 
One of the features of the theological understandings of both Paul and 
Augustine which may be considered most objectionable in secular discourse 
about addiction is that of the power of sin. And yet, it is also this theology of 
sin which seems to provide a better account of the experience of addiction 
than do purely scientific theses. Both Paul and Augustine understood sin 
as exerting a power over people such that their moral choices are distorted 
and impaired. At the same time, the weakness of the flesh, and concu- 
piscence, tend to make human beings vulnerable to this power, such that 
they make morally wrong judgements and misuse their free will. In short, 
sin tends to enslave and to bring people into captivity to self-indulgence. 
Original sin and concupiscence, according to Augustine, are biologically 
acquired. But sin also affects social relationships and is socially effected. 
As McFadyen eloquently shows in the context of the Holocaust and child 
sexual abuse, sin can so permeate the social environment that it engages as 
willing participants those who are its victims. Those who are not morally 
culpable in the usual secular sense become engaged as active participants in 
the very processes of injustice and immorality of which they are themselves 
victims. 
, S_ Glatt and Cook. 1487. 
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This would seem to offer a very good description of the way in which 
biological, psychological and social processes contribute to the pathology 
of addiction. Inherited predispositions to alcohol dependence combine 
with social pressures to conform to a heavy drinking culture, and with 
the psychological power of habit in such a way that people are innocently 
drawn into dependent patterns of drinking which they then actively seek to 
continue, even to their own detriment and that of those around them. In 
this sense there is an apparent `power' of addictive behaviour which seems 
to enslave and to bring people into captivity. Thus dependent drinkers find 
that they hide their drinking, and sacrifice those people and things which 
they hold as valuable at the altar of that which has enslaved them. 
The present argument is intended to imply neither the objective reality 
of evil powers nor their demythologisation. What is inherent to the present 
discussion is that sin is experienced as a power which adversely influences 
human choice and decision-making, and which engages people in the very 
processes which bring about their own enslavement. This would indeed 
also appear to provide a good account of the processes of addiction. 
The internal struggle: divisions of self and will 
The exploration of the parallels between addiction and sin which has been 
undertaken here has focussed especially upon subjective experience. It has 
been argued that the experience of the divided self in Romans 7, and the 
experience of the divided will in book VIII of Augustine's Confessions, both 
provide accounts of subjective experiences which have many features in 
common with the subjective experience of addiction. While these accounts 
are both primarily theological, the philosophical analysis and contemporary 
language and terminology of Frankfurt are also helpful in clarifying the 
nature of the division of the will which is experienced in addictive disorders 
such as alcohol dependence, and which is also to be found in Augustine's 
account of his personal journey to conversion to Christianity. Frankfurt 
further argues that this capacity to self-reflect and to make second-order 
volitions is at the heart of what it means to be a person. Perhaps, then, the 
possibility of addiction is inherent in the human experience of personhood. 
Theologically, this internal conflict is made possible by the meeting of 
concupiscence and original sin with the grace of God in the experience of 
individual human beings. Human beings do not make decisions about life 
with full knowledge of their consequences, and neither do they do so in 
a completely neutral and rational way. The weakness of human beings (in 
their flesh) is easily drawn by the power of sin towards self-indulgence and 
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a form of religion which is self-serving, but also radically self-enslaving. 
On the other hand, at least according to Augustine and Paul, they have 
the opportunity to serve God, and in so doing to experience freedom. 
Only in this way may desire, volition and action be brought into har- 
mony and the divisions of the will be healed. Human beings thus face a 
choice between two competing powers, or (to use the language of Theis- 
sen) tribunals. We are not neutral agents (perhaps most especially we are 
not when we imagine that we are) - we will be drawn into the sphere of 
influence of one or the other. The one will enslave, and the other will bring 
freedom. 
McFadyen has developed this theme in terms of worship and idolatry. 
Worship of God, which might appear at first to be a form of slavery, is 
actually characterised in Augustinian theology as life-enriching and as a 
state of `loving joy'. Idolatry, as worship of anything that is not God, acts 
to block and disorientate joy. Alcohol dependence, with its narrowing of the 
repertoire of enjoyment of alcohol, its salience of alcohol over other (more 
highly valued) people and things, and its subjective compulsion towards 
harmful behaviour is just such an orientation of life under the power of 
sin. For the willing addict, this may initially not offer a source of conflict. 
However, for the unwilling addict who is attracted (to use Pauline and 
Augustinian terminology) by the grace of God, an experience of division 
of the will must arise. The pattern of behaviour which has been the object 
of willing consent then becomes understood as a habit which enslaves. The 
will which was identified as `self becomes understood as 'now not really I' 
and the `true' self is understood as an unwilling sufferer, held captive by 
the power of sin. 
The search for the highest good 
Augustine's search for the highest good is the essential context to an under- 
standing of the turmoil of his divided will in Book VIII of Confessions. 
For Augustine, perfect freedom was to be found only in a proper orien- 
tation towards God. For Paul also, Christ was everything, to be sought 
above all other things which (in comparison) he regarded as `rubbish'. 'SS It 
is in this context that these two men have left us with their accounts of the 
divided self and the divided will. Can such a single-minded existential quest 
be expected of those who merely seek to be free from the life-restricting 
influence of alcohol dependence? 
 Philippians 3: 8. 
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It is of importance to note that the Twelve Step programme of AA does 
indeed require that life be turned over to God (Step 3) and that conscious 
contact be sought with him through prayer and meditation (Step ii). In 
his history of AA, Ernest Kurtz emphasises the importance to alcoholics in 
AA of recognising that they are `not God'. '59 Something beyond the self, 
something transcendent of the self, seems to have been recognised by the 
founders of AA as being necessary for recovery from alcoholism. However, 
it is clear that the treatment of alcohol dependence is not always associ- 
ated with this transcendent goal. Perhaps, for those who recover through 
other means, it is merely necessary to acknowledge pursuit of a higher good 
than the state of alcohol dependence in which they have found themselves 
entrapped. However, the second-order volition that would seem to be nec- 
essary to any kind of recovery would appear to require acknowledgement 
at least of this - that individuals desire something better, something other, 
than that they remain dependent upon alcohol. 
The need for grace 
We thus come, at last, to the acknowledgement of both Paul and Augustine 
that only the grace of God provides a way out of the inner conflict of the 
division of self and will. It would seem inherent to the experience of Paul, 
Augustine, and the founders of AA that they each faced an awareness that 
they could not `will' themselves out of the captivity in which they found 
themselves held. 
For Paul, the solution was to be found in an assertion of eschatological 
hope, founded upon faith in the uniqueness of the gracious act of God in 
Jesus Christ. For Augustine, it was only by an act of the grace of God that 
he was able to `put on the Lord Jesus Christ' at last. For the founders of 
AA, it was a recognition that they had to turn over their lives to God, as 
they understood him. 
For Augustine, a lifetime of struggling to understand what had happened 
failed to address the paradox presented by his conviction that faith in Christ 
was both a matter of free choice and also wholly the grace of God. Perhaps 
Stump's analysis of this problem provides at least a partial answer in terms of 
the need for the person with a divided will to stop resisting the grace of God, 
so that God may then graciously confer a second-order volition of faith. 
Similarly, for the alcohol-dependent person, at least an end to the second- 
order volition to continue drinking would seem to be a necessary prelude 
 Kunz, 1991" pp. 3-4. 
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to finding a second-order volition to stop drinking. But is something more 
than this required? 
It is suggested here that a theological model of addiction must follow 
Paul and Augustine in recognising the need for the grace of God in recovery 
from addiction. Perhaps there are those who find recovery without recog- 
nising this need. But the whole dynamic of the division of self and will is 
concerned with human weakness in the face of the power of sin. The sense 
of powerlessness of will that is inherent in the experience of a divided will is 
such that it requires an individual at least to look towards something higher 
than self as offering a way out. Even if this is not the highest good, it must 
needs be a Higher Power. The nature of the struggle implicitly recognises 
the need for grace - or at least something which looks very much like it - 
as the means of finding freedom and wholeness. 
